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Abstract
The economic consequences of limits on political donations depend on the degree of
political competition. Donors, who are ideologically aligned with candidates, decide how
much to contribute to their own candidate. They may benet from rent-seeking by their own
candidate but dislike rent-seeking by the opposition. Increased rent-seeking by politicians
thus generates campaign contributions for themselves but also mobilizes donations to the
opposing candidate, potentially to a greater extent. This latter e¤ect acts as a deterrent
to rent-seeking when contributions nance electoral campaigns and positively a¤ect election
chances. When political competition is low, incumbent donors outnumber opposition donors
and limits reduce rent-seeking. When political competition is high, donors are equalized and
laissez-faire reduces rent-seeking. Consistent with these hypotheses, data from the US states
suggest that limits are associated with better policies and stronger growth performance at
low levels of political competition, whilst laissez-faire is preferred when political competition
is high.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes that limits on political donations are mistaken when political competi-
tion is su¢ciently high. Besley et al (2010) establish that political competition has a strong
benecial role in terms of improving policy and generating better growth outcomes in the
context of the US states. In this paper we argue that this mechanism is enhanced by political
donations, provided that the degree of political competition is su¢ciently high. However if
political competition is low, then money acts corrosively, and thus political donations should
be constrained.
At a basic level the question of whether to limit political donations depends on the
motives of donors. In our model donors are ideologically aligned and may benet or be
harmed by rent-seeking by their own candidate. The conception of rent-seeking used in
this paper is general (and is dened more fully below) but necessarily implies some overall
wastefulness in policy. Importantly donors also dislike, potentially to a greater extent, rent-
seeking by the opponent. Hence increased rent-seeking in o¢ce can have the e¤ect of both
increasing donations to the candidate herself, but also increasing donations to the opposition.
When donations nance campaigns that positively a¤ect electoral outcomes, the response of
opposition donors acts as a brake on rent-seeking.
The question of whether or not limits on political donations are to be preferred therefore
depends on the extent of political competition. Lower political competition means relatively
higher donations and core voters for the incumbent candidate, and a reduced likelihood of
the opposition winning. Incumbent politicians therefore discount this outcome and rent-
seeking rises as the incumbents own rent-seeking incentives are aligned with their support
base. Limits on donations thus reduce rent-seeking at low levels of political competition. On
the other hand high political competition means more numerous opposition donors. Here
both candidates face stronger incentives to reduce rent-seeking, because of the impetus to
reduce donations to the opposing candidate, thereby enhancing their own electoral chances
when donations nance e¤ective electoral campaigns. Here laissez-faire, by which we mean
absence of limits on donations, is the optimal policy.
Empirical evidence supports these hypotheses. Using the same data set as Besley et al
(2010) and extending it through 2014, we nd consistent evidence that limits improve policy,
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and indeed are associated with higher economic growth in reduced form regressions, when
political competition is low. However, when political competition is high, then it is laissez-
faire which is associated with improved policy and growth.1 At current average levels of
political competition then the results suggest that laissez-faire should be preferred, although
limits are predominant in practice (currently applying in 38/48 states). Moreover 7 out of
the 10 states with laissez-faire are currently experiencing political competition levels that
are su¢ciently low that limits would in these instances be preferred. Hence we conclude that
most states are, at the time of writing, getting their campaign nance laws wrong.
A key issue, on which the literature has not reached consensus, is the extent to which
donors are motivated by rent-seeking. Typically donations have been modeled in the lit-
erature as either position-induced or service-induced (Ashworth, 2008). Donations buy
ideological inuence in the former case, and special favors at the expense of citizens in the
latter. However, Ansolabehere et al (2003) document that the majority of campaign con-
tributions in the case of the US come in the shape of small donations from individuals.
Arguably such donations are inconsistent with policy procurement (of either type).2 Instead
Ansolabehere et al (2003) propose that donating (for many at least) is a form of political
participation or consumption. One possible story is that donors obtain a return in votes
generated from ensuing advertising: either because voters believe its claims or because its
mere existence is an endorsement signal. Relatedly, it is not impossible that donors are
acting out of altruism. This may be unappealing to much of the economics literature, but it
has to be acknowledged that in the case of small donors the quid pro quo is not obvious.3
Our model is therefore exible on donor motives. These can vary from the strongly
1On political competition Becker (1958), Stigler (1972), Wittman (1989) and Acemoglu (2003) all draw
a parallel between monopoly in economics and the absence of competition in politics. In both instances
welfare is generally compromised when power is uncontested. In practice scale economies, high entry costs,
commitment problems, voter ignorance or outright corruption of the process, may all serve to reduce political
competition and undermine the democratic ideal. Nonetheless, the idea that political competition is always
virtuous is not a total consensus. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest a mechanism wherein competition
can lead to instability - leading to greater discounting by the incumbent. Analyzing the e¤ect of political
competition on policy and growth is the substance of Besley et al (2010), which we build upon in this paper.
2Milyo, Primo and Groseclose (2000) also argue that there is no obvious link between political favors and
contributions.
3Similarly the literature on charitable giving is not consensual on donor motives, e.g. see Andreoni (2006).
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benign, when they are aligned with the electorate at large, to the strongly malign, when
they are aligned with the politicians, who we assume to be rent-seeking. Arguably the former
position underpins the idea of donations as a form of free speech,4 whilst the latter relates
to the buying of favors or straightforward (service-induced) corruption. In the extreme
cases, the policy implications are trivial - if donors are strongly benign then laissez-faire is
preferred, and if donors are strongly malign limits are preferred. However, the analysis below
identies an intermediate category, where donors are dened as weakly benign. Here the
policy implications are conditional on the degree of political competition.
The extant theoretical literature examining the consequences of contribution limits has
not reached consensus.5 Prat (2002) nds that a ban can be welfare-improving depending
on whether the gain from reduced policy distortion outweighs the lost advertising channel
through which candidate quality may be signalled. Coate (2004b) argues more strongly
that limits on donations can be Pareto optimal even when advertising is fully truthful.6
Nonetheless Coate acknowledges (p. 642) that in his model the donors incentives are nar-
rowly dened as motivated only through (service-induced) direct transfers. On the other
hand Coate (2004a) analyzes the case of position-induced contributions and nds that the
imposition of limits raises the likelihood that parties will select extremist candidates - to the
detriment of the welfare of ordinary citizens.7
In empirical work Milyo (2012) and Cordis and Milyo (2013) ask respectively whether
contribution limits a¤ect trust and condence in state government, and whether they a¤ect
public corruption in the US. In both cases no relationship is found. Similarly Primo and
Milyo (2006) nd no signicant link between campaign nance laws and political e¢cacy.8
4The rst amendment underpinned the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to strike down
campaign expenditure limits in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). More latterly it also informed McCutcheon v. the
Federal Election Commission (2014).
5Stratmann (2005) is an excellent review of the earlier literature.
6A further benecial channel, identied by Cotton (2012), is that limits will reduce politician access costs,
thereby encouraging informative lobby group formation.
7Moreover Dahm and Porteiro (2008) and Cotton (2009) emphasize the functional importance of interest
groups as information providers. Contribution limits can serve to restrict this channel.
8Relatedly, there is some disagreement on the impact of limits on political competition. Stratmann and
Aparicio-Castillo (2006) nd that limits lead to greater political competition, in particular closer elections
in the lower house of US state governments, whilst Lott (2006) conversely nds that contribution limits in
US state senate elections reduces competitiveness. Following Besley et al (2010) we instrument for political
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As we show below all of this is consistent with our notion of weakly benign donors. In
this case limits will lead to greater rent-seeking when political competition is high, but less
rent-seeking when political competition is low. It follows that the arguments for laissez-
faire are more potent when competition is high - indeed the key rationale for laissez-faire in
general, whilst the arguments for limits (that they will act against corruption or diversion
of resources) are most potent when political competition is low.
This paper is also related to the literature examining the e¤ectiveness of campaign expen-
diture on voting. Its e¤ectiveness (or lack thereof) might say something about the perceived
motives of donors. If donations were service-induced, voters might recognize that extravagant
campaigns simply signal promised favors, and thus would not respond to the advertising, as
argued by Coate (2004b). However, given position- (or even altruistically-) induced dona-
tions - donors who are aligned with the electorate - then a positive vote response is viable.9
In support of the rst argument, Levitt (1994) found little e¤ect using evidence from US
House elections. However, recent work is more supportive, e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar
(1996) and Rekkas (2007). Johnston and Pattie (2006) apply Levitts methodology for the
case of the UK and nd that challenger campaign spending in particular has a substantial
impact on the vote. Gerber (2004) provides a rationale for the weak evidence relating to
incumbents, distinguishing between the objectives of maximizing vote share and gaining
re-election. Gerber and Green (2000) and Green and Gerber (2008) identify interesting dif-
ferences in e¤ectiveness across types of campaigning: some are estimated to substantially
increase vote shares, but others, notably broadcast advertising, have often been found to
be relatively expensive in terms of delivering votes (Krasno and Green, 2008). Overall, this
literature certainly doesnt allow us to rule out the possibility that advertising, and more
generally candidate or party resources, play some role in a¤ecting the vote.
Following the theory the empirical analysis examines how policymaking and growth
change depending on the existence of limits on donations by individuals to particular political
candidates, and how this relationship changes with political competition. The analysis rst
competition in the empirical analysis to deal with potential endogeneity in the political competition variable.
9Potters et al (1997) analyze a mechanism through which uninformed voters glean positive signals through
campaign expenditure funded by an informed donor.
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follows previous literature by rst taking the presence of limits to be exogenous.10 Indeed
Milyo (2012) describes variation in campaign nance laws as a "natural experiment". The
econometric results consistently nd that the existence of limits are detrimental for policy
at high levels of competition, for example are associated with high taxes and the absence
of right-to-work laws, but are benecial for policy at low levels of competition. Similarly
growth is negatively related to limits at high levels of competition, whilst the association is
positive when political competition is low.
However, whilst these results are indicative, there remains the possibility that state-level
campaign nance regulation is determined jointly with state level policy. (After all, the
central message of this paper is that rent-seeking conditionally depends on campaign nance
regulation, and a rent maximizing incumbent might set the nancing regime accordingly.)
To alleviate this concern we supplement the analysis using an instrument variable (IV)
approach. As we discuss below the clear driver of the existence of limits on donations was
the Watergate scandal, which culminated in the resignation of President Nixon in 1974, and
a resultant hardening of the Federal Elections Campaigns Act also in that year. In the
following year 15 states switched, permanently, from laissez-faire to the imposition of limits.
Because Watergate was an issue for federal government it can be considered exogenous
in terms of its e¤ect on state-level policy. In order to obtain geographic variation in the
Watergate e¤ect we propose an instrument where the e¤ect is discounted with geographic
distance from Washington DC - the argument being that the event was more salient for
proximate states. Diagnostic testing indicates that distance as well as the timing of this event
inuenced the regime choice. The results from the IV regressions support the inference from
the OLS regressions: limits are found to be harmful at high levels of political competition
and benecial at low levels of political competition.
We also examine how political competition a¤ects economic policy and growth in a re-
duced sample consisting of the 15 states that switched regime in 1975, permanently, from
laissez-faire to a system of limits. Within these 15 states we nd a signicant change in how
political competition a¤ects policy and growth, following the regime change. Prior to 1974,
10Stratmann (2011) and Milyo (2012) take contribution limits as exogenous in their empirical analysis.
Besley and Case (2003) also take this approach their review of the e¤ects of political institutions in the US.
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under laissez-faire, in both policy and growth regressions, the benecial e¤ect of political
competition is estimated to be statistically signicant as would be expected. Post-1974, un-
der limits, the e¤ect of political competition, on both policy and growth, is reduced. Under
the identifying assumption that the regime change in this instance was exogenous, then we
infer that this change itself caused the change in the political competition gradient.
The next section develops the theoretical analysis, and formalizes the proposition that
rent-seeking in government depends on the existence of limits on political donations, and
that this relationship is conditioned by the level of political competition. Section 3 contains
the empirical analysis and section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
The model is a generalization of Besley et al (2010) to include donors and a voting response
to political advertising. There are two candidates standing for election, denoted L and R.
Both are motivated by the rents they can extract from the electorate,11 which in equilibrium
are non-zero because of probabilistic voting. The electorate is split into three factions. There
is an ideological spectrum from 0 (where L is positioned) to 1 (where R is positioned) with
mass points at 0 and 1 representing habitual voters who vote for their candidate regardless
of campaign advertising or indeed di¤erences in rent-seeking. The sizes of these two factions
are denoted by γL and γR, where the relative advantage of the left is denoted λ = γL−γR.
12
The third group (size σ = 1 − γL − γR) are swing voters, spread out uniformly along the
ideological spectrum. The model departs from Besley et al in allowing a role for donations. In
the model the habitual voters are also potential donors. If donations are to be characterized
by consumption - as argued by Ansolabehere et al (2003), then it seems plausible that the
donors be partisan.13 Furthermore it seems plausible that numerical advantage in core voters
11Rent extraction and resource diversion are synonymous in this analysis. Both are the antonym of pro-
growth policies.
12Without loss of generality the Democrats are modeled as potentially possessing electoral advantage, i.e.
γL ≥ γR (essentially because we have Southern Democrats in mind). The model is symmetric and the results
below would not be altered if instead it were the right in a position of dominance.
13In a survey of donors Barber (2016) nds that individual donors consistently rank ideological concerns
as highly important in determining donation decisions.
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will also map to numerical advantage in donations.
2.1 The political-economic model
Candidates ideological platforms are xed exogenously at 0 or 1. Following Besley et al
(2010) in the rst stage of the model candidates commit to economic policy, conducive or
otherwise to growth and thereby implying a level of rent extraction. Donors contribute funds
in the second stage - assuming they are permitted - in order to maximize their own objective
function, and voting occurs in the nal stage. The model is solved backwards.
All electors vote for the candidate whose policies they think will give them the most
utility. A swing voter with ideology i obtains the following payo¤s from left and right
governments:
U iL = −βi− rL +

2
(ML −MR) +
η
2
(1)
U iR = −β (1− i)− rR −

2
(ML −MR)−
η
2
(2)
where β denotes the (preference) weight attached to ideology. Dene rC (C = L,R) as
rents associated with candidate C.14 Rent-seeking could take the form of lower e¤ort by
elected o¢cials, or it could represent wasteful or indulgent spending programmes, and out-
right corruption as monetary transfers. Besley et al (2010) establish that such policies are
detrimental to growth. MC represents funds raised by candidate C, which then facilitates
advertising expenditure and η is a relative popularity shock distributed uniformly between
− 1
2ξ
and 1
2ξ
.
To model utility as directly responsive to campaign expenditure is a reduced form rep-
resentation of arguments outlined in the introduction.15 This is undeniably a short cut, but
a full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. One possible justication is
that donations pay for favorable publicity which raises the perceived utility of getting that
14In our model we explicitly model rent-seeking, whereas Besley et al (2010) examine a payo¤-function
(in their model v) that depends monotonically on a policy variable (in their model - τ). Our approach is to
model rents directly. The substance of the results relating to political competition are very similar.
15Maloney and Pickering (2013) model voting as a direct function of political capital, which includes
nances.
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candidate in. Alternatively the advertising may indirectly (Prat, 2002) or directly (Coate,
2004b) signal candidate quality, and having money in the utility function at least captures
these consequences in the voting decision. The debate concerning advertising e¤ectiveness is
encapsulated in the parameter  ≥ 0. Given (1) and (2) the indi¤erent voter is characterized
by
i∗ = 0.5 +
rR − rL
2β
+
 (ML −MR)
2β
+
η
2β
, (3)
hence given the uniform distribution of the popularity shock the probability of a left-wing
victory (pL) is
pL = 0.5 +
βξλ
σ
+ ξ (rR − rL +  (ML −MR)) . (4)
As conventional in this literature it is assumed that the popularity shock η is su¢ciently
large to rule out corner solutions.16 The second term on the RHS encapsulates political
competition. Its e¤ect on the candidates chances declines with greater popularity shocks
(lower values of ξ), and increases with β, the weight placed on ideology by the swing voters
(which, as with Besley et al (2010), serves to reduce the potency of the popularity shock).
Political competition also increases (i.e. βξλ
σ
gets closer to zero) when the proportion of swing
voters (σ) increases.
Donors come from the habitual voters (γL and γR). They are "citizen-donors" in that
an election loss yields ideological loss as well as a utility loss due to rent-seeking by the
opposing candidate. Donors are also potentially motivated by rent-seeking of their own
candidate. Formally the individual (j) donors payo¤s are represented by:
U
D
j
L
L = θrL −
φ (M j)
2
2
(5)
U
D
j
L
R = −β − rR −
φ (M j)
2
2
(6)
U
D
j
R
L = −β − rL −
φ (M j)
2
2
(7)
U
D
j
R
R = θrR −
φ (M j)
2
2
(8)
16See Persson and Tabellini (2000) pp. 54.
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where U
D
j
L
L captures the utility to the leftist donors of a left-wing victory whilst U
D
j
L
R denes
their payo¤s under a right-wing victory. U
D
j
R
L and U
D
j
R
R symmetrically dene the payo¤s to
the right-wing donors.17 ,18 φ > 0 is a quadratic costs parameter19 and M j is the money
donated by individual donor j. θ characterizes donor motives as follows:
When θ = −1 donors are entirely benign. Their interests are perfectly aligned with those
of the electorate.
When −1 < θ < 0 donors are strongly benign. They expect a net disadvantage from
their candidates rent-seeking but not to the extent that voters do.
When 0 < θ < 1 donors are weakly benign.20 They expect to gain from any rents
collected by their candidate but to lose more from rents collected by the other candidate.
When θ > 1, donors are malign. They are more positive about their own-candidate rents
than they are averse to rents by the opposition.
If θ = 1, donors interests are perfectly aligned with those of their candidate. If θ actually
exceeds 1, then donors expect to do even better from government rents than the government
itself does. This might happen, for instance, if both the donors and their preferred candidate
are going to prot from a tari¤ or licensed monopoly which keeps out competition in one
or more industries but the donors stand to gain even more than the candidate does. We do
17The model assumes that only habitual voters donate. In principle oating voters could also donate,
perhaps motivated against rent and by ideological distance from the partisan positions. Allowing oating
voter donations might dampen but it would not eliminate the main argument of the paper. Moreover, in
support of the approach taken here, in practice Barber (2016) identies ideological alignment as the most
important characteristic identifying individual donors in survey data from the 2012 election cycle.
18One implication of these payo¤ functions is that for either of the habitual voter groups, donations by
donors with similar preferences can be welfare-enhancing (depending on θ), whilst those by donors with
opposite tastes are welfare-decreasing. However, even if rent-seeking benets a specic group of partisans,
by denition it entails welfare-loss at the aggregate.
19Donors also clearly incur nancial costs of donating, which we model as quadratic. A simple plausible
justication for this could be that larger donations incur increasing utility losses.
20We prefer weakly benign to weakly malign because under these preferences individual donor aversion
to opposition rent-seeking exceeds their weaker liking for own-candidate rent-seeking. Net preferences, at
the individual level, are averse to rent.
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assume, however, that θ has an upper limit in order to rule out the implausible case in which
higher rents attract so much donor money that their net e¤ect on the candidates chance of
winning is non-negative. This would result in both parties going for innite rents. θ, then, is
low enough to satisfy the condition dpC
drC
< 0. (This can be shown to mean that θ < φ+ξN
2γR
ξN2γL
when N is the state population size and γL > γR.) We have set the lower limit of θ = −1
because if it were any lower, donors would be even more averse to their candidate collecting
rents than the electorate as a whole. We cannot think of any circumstances in which this
would arise.
In practice political candidates receive donations from many sources, indeed from con-
tributors with di¤ering motives (though we do not model this heterogeneity in this paper).
Hence increased rent-seeking might induce some donors to increase donations whilst others
may reduce donations. The parameter θ can be interpreted as capturing how donations in
aggregate respond to political rent-seeking. The case of θ = −1 (benign donors) thus charac-
terizes position-induced contributions, whilst θ > 0 (malign donors) increasingly represents
service-induced contributions.21
Note that the model ignores the common good (or cooperation) problem of donors. A
possible theoretical objection is that individual donors would rationally choose to free-ride
and thus not donate. However, as noted in the introduction the motives of donors are not
completely understood. Indeed the common-good problem suggests there would be zero
donations, certainly at the small donor level, which evidently is not the case. The puzzle
is related to the paradox of voting: both voting and donating are costly, and the benets of
doing so are vanishingly small, yet voting and donating still occurs. One possible countenance
to the paradox of voting is Riker and Ordeshooks (1973) minimum rational choice theory,
where voters also dene their political e¤ectiveness "in terms of the inuence of groups of
people like themselves... Consequently they are motivated to take action because they feel
they can collectively make a di¤erence" (Clarke et al, 2004, p. 248.) The argument applies
21At a deeper level the parameter θ could be considered endogenous to the level of donations. For example
particular favours might merit particular prices. The approach taken here simplies by specifying the para-
meter as exogenous, but still considering alternative values which it might take. In defence of this approach
the degree to which donors might benet from rent-seeking is at least to some extent (and on average) likely
to be constrained by external factors such as (for example) the law.
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equally (indeed perhaps more strongly) to donors as it does to voters. Hence donors, like
voters, may still positively act.
When donors are malign, candidates have an unambiguous incentive to increase rents,
for themselves and also to please donors in order to raise money for advertising. Conversely
when donors are strongly benign they e¤ectively hold the candidates to account and it pays
candidates to raise money by cutting rents: were they to increase them this would now
both mobilize opposition donors, and deter their own support base. The interesting case
is where donors are weakly benign - when 0 < θ < 1. Here, increasing rents generate a
positive, though relatively small, nancial response from the candidates own support base,
whilst simultaneously mobilizing the oppositions support to a larger extent. However, as
one candidates support base grows larger than the others - i.e. as political competition de-
teriorates - it may reach the point where its rent-seeking gives it a larger aggregate nancial,
and therefore electoral, gain than is handed to its opponent. These issues are explored in
greater detail below.
Leftist donors choose donations to maximize pLU
D
j
L
L + (1− pL)U
D
j
L
R whilst right-wing
donors maximize (1− pL)U
D
j
R
R + pLU
D
j
R
L . Using (4) and (5)-(8) yields
ML =
ξγLN (β + rR + θrL)
φ
(9)
MR =
ξγRN (β + rL + θrR)
φ
(10)
where ML =
R
j
M jLdj is total leftist donations and MR =
R
j
M jRdj is total rightist dona-
tions. Hence money raised increases the greater the ideological stakes (β) and also when
rent-seeking by the opposing candidate increases. Whether or not donations increase with
own-candidate rent-seeking depends on the extent to which donors themselves accrue rents
themselves when their candidate wins - the parameter θ. Combining (9) and (10) yields
ML −MR =
ξN (βλ+ (γLθ − γR) rL + (γL − γRθ) rR)
φ
,
11
or, using the denitions γL − γR = λ and γL + γR = 1− σ,
ML −MR =
ξN
 
βλ+
 
1−θ
2

(1− σ)−
 
1+θ
2
λ

rL +
 
1−θ
2

(1− σ) +
 
1+θ
2
λ

rR

φ
. (11)
Finally, candidates expected payo¤s are given by
UC = pCrC .
Since UC = pCrC ,
dU
dr
= 0 implies that
rC =
pC
−dpC
drC
. (12)
Equation (12) shows that rC is increasing in pC , i.e. that the candidate with the best
chance of winning will sacrice some of this advantage for increased rents. He will, however,
remain the favorite to win: were he to take so much rent that pL falls below 0.5 then (again
from 12) his rents would be below those of the disadvantaged candidate too. As this is
self-contradictory, we can conclude that λ > 0 implies both pL > 0.5 and rL > rR.
From (12) we can derive expected total government rents under limits and laissez-faire.
In general:
E (R) = pLrL + pRrR =
p2L
−dpL
drL
+
p2R
−dpR
drR
. (13)
To analyze the case of limits on donations we make the simplifying assumption that in
this case dML
drL
= dMR
drR
= 0. If the cap on donations is binding, then changes in policy (i.e. rent-
seeking) at the margin will not a¤ect total donations. In this case from (4) −dpL
drL
= −dpR
drR
= ξ
and so, using R to denote expected rents with limits and writing pL simply as p,
R =
1
ξ
 
p2 + (1− p)2

. (14)
Under limits, there is an unambiguous positive relationship between total rent-seeking (R)
and p. Note that both variables change with the level of political competition (λ) - analyzing
this is the subject of the next section. R also falls as ξ increases. Higher values of ξ reduce
12
the importance of the popularity shock, hence serve to improve policy (indeed under either
regime).
Under laissez-faire, then putting (11) into (4) implies that
p = 0.5 +
ξβλ (1 + ξm)
φ
− π1rL + π2rR (15)
where m = N2 and
π1 =
ξφ+ ξ2m
 
1−θ
2

(1− σ)−
 
1+θ
2
λ

φ
= −
dp
drL
(16)
π2 =
ξφ+ ξ2m
 
1−θ
2

(1− σ) +
 
1+θ
2
λ

φ
= −
dpR
drR
. (17)
Hence, writing R for expected rents under laissez-faire,
R =
p2
π1
+
(1− p)2
π2
. (18)
In the case of laissez-faire the relationship between R and p depends on the composite
parameters π1 and π2.
2.2 Rents, political competition and campaign donations
We are now in a position to see when limits will reduce government rents. A preliminary
result is:
Proposition 1 The greater the political competition, the lower the rents.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 reects standard arguments in favor of political competition. The stronger
the constraints of electoral competition the better the quality of government. As rising λ
gives one candidate a better chance of winning then the other, the stronger candidate will
trade in some of her chances for additional rents, while the weaker candidate will mitigate
their poorer chances by giving up rents. But given that the dominant candidate is still
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more likely to win, the rise in its rents raise expected rents by more than the fall in the
weaker candidatess rents reduces them. The logic here is the same as the main prediction
in proposition 1 of Besley et al (2010). Furthermore:
Proposition 2 The more malign the donors, the higher the laissez-faire rents.
Proof. See Appendix.
With malign donors, candidates have a second incentive to collect rents: to increase
the utility of donors, raise more money from them, spend it, increase their own chance of
election, and trade some of this additional chance for still more rents. Furthermore, under
malign donors, the question of whether or not limits should be imposed is simple:
Proposition 3 If donors are malign then rents under laissez-faire (i) are higher than under
limits at maximum political competition and (ii) increase more rapidly as competition declines
than they do under limits. Therefore with malign donors rents are always higher under
laissez-faire.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of this is that laissez-faire opens a channel through which candidates wish
to please donors and, because politician and donor motives are aligned, money is raised
by increasing total rents. As political competition deteriorates these arguments apply more
strongly: there are now increasing numbers of (malign) donors contributing to the electorally
advantaged candidate, and more open nance contributes to their chances of winning. How-
ever, when donors are weakly benign, the issue is more complex:
Proposition 4 If donors are weakly benign (0 < θ < 1), rents are lower under laissez-faire
when political competition is high but higher under laissez-faire when political competition is
low. Therefore they increase more rapidly as competition declines than they do under limits.
Proof. See Appendix.
If donors are benign (even weakly so) and there is perfect political competition (λ = 0),
candidates will give up more rents under laissez-faire than under spending limits because
laissez-faire gives them the added incentive of raising more money than the opposition by
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sacricing rents. As political competition falls, however, the dominant candidate will trade
in some of its increased probability of winning for higher rents. Since laissez-faire enhances
her chances of winning still further (because she will have more money to spend than her rival
by virtue of her bigger donor base) she will purchase even more rents. The negative e¤ect
of rent-collecting via increased donations to the opposition becomes less of a consideration
when that opposition is relatively small. If donors are only weakly benign, there will be some
level of political uncompetitiveness at which laissez-faire leads to higher expected rents than
spending limits do.
On the other hand if donors are strongly benign, then laissez-faire is unconditionally the
preferred regime:
Proposition 5 If donors are strongly benign rents are lower under laissez-faire at all levels
of political competition.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this case declining competition cannot overcome the initial incentive that candidates
have to give up rents under laissez-faire.
Proposition 6 If donors are entirely benign then rents under laissez-faire are not only lower
than under limits, but increase more slowly as competition declines than they do under limits.
Proof. See Appendix.
Increasing rents now loses so much campaign money that the stronger candidates in-
centive to raise rents as competition declines is now weaker under laissez-faire than under
limits (when the loss of money does not matter.) Exactly the same applies to the weaker
candidates incentive to cut rents, but the e¤ects on the stronger candidate dominate the
picture because she is more likely to be elected.
Whether or not limits will lower average rent-seeking in government thus depends on two
factors: donors motives and the extent of political competition. When donors are malign it is
unambiguous: regardless of political competition, laissez-faire should be avoided. However, if
donors are strongly benign, then regardless of the degree of political competition, advertising
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and free donations act to enhance the democratic process. When donors are weakly benign,
the amount of political competition makes all the di¤erence.
Figure 1 depicts the various possibilities. All the curves slope upwards (proposition 1)
and, with laissez-faire, the more malign the donors the higher the degree of rent-seeking
(proposition 2). The malign donors laissez-faire curve is above and steeper than the limits
curve (proposition 3). The curve for weakly benign donors under laissez-faire intersects the
curve with spending limits (proposition 4), the curve for strongly benign donors stays below
the curve with spending limits (proposition 5) and the curve for entirely benign donors does
the same, with the gap between the two now increasing in λ (proposition 6).
The most interesting case is that of weakly benign donors (0 < θ < 1). For values of
θ in this range, we know from proposition 4 that rents under laissez-faire are lower than
under limits when there is maximum political competition (λ = 0) but that as political
competition deteriorates this result will eventually be reversed. If λ is large enough, the
dominant candidate is incentivized to raise rents, in part because this now gives smaller
nancial benets to the opposition as their donor base shrinks.
This is why weakly benign donors are the most interesting ones. Otherwise the debate
over laws governing campaign nance has little traction. When donors are unambiguously
malign, then limits are surely desirable. When they are clearly aligned with the electorate
- i.e. strongly benign  their preferences will be served by advertising with a positive infor-
mative role. The fact that this debate is as vociferous as it is, suggests that we do not have
a clear idea over donor motives. Perhaps there is truth to both sides of the argument.
The clear insight from this analysis is the conditioning role of political competition. If
this is high, then free-speech and advertising might be expected to have a positive role in
the democratic process. Here the competition for contributions works to complement the
competition for votes. However if political competition is low, then permitting donations
might only serve to exacerbate rent-seeking in government. Laissez-faire can either intensify
competition or entrench a near-monopoly.
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3 Empirical Evidence
The theory above guides the empirical work. Limits on donations are hypothesised to have
a benecial impact on policy and growth under low political competition, but be harmful
under high levels of political competition. To investigate these hypotheses we build on the
empirical work of Besley et al (2010) and examine annual data for the US States over the
period 1950-2014.22 Section 3.1 describes the key explanatory variables used in the analysis.
In subsection 3.2 we analyze policy and in subsection 3.3 we investigate the (reduced-form)
link between growth and the existence limits and how this changes with observed political
competition. Subsection 3.4 investigates the robustness of the results when the existence
of limits is instrumented using an interaction of the Watergate time e¤ect in 1975 and ge-
ographic distance from DC. This subsection also focuses specically on the 15 states which
permanently changed their policy from laissez-faire to limits at this point in time. This
particular regime switch plausibly was driven by exogenous events, in particular the estab-
lishment of the Federal Election Commission and the strengthening of the Federal Election
Campaign Act in 1974, both of which stemmed from the Watergate scandal. Subsection
3.5 addresses the question of whether or not policy in practice is optimal, given observed
measures of political competition.
3.1 Data
The dependent variables follow Besley et al (2010) and are described below. The key driving
variables are political competition and the presence or not of limits on political donations.
The political competition measure (κst) is an update of that used in Besley et al (2010),
originating from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002).23 This averages out, state by state and
election year by election year, the Democratic and Republican votes for all the state o¢cials
being elected in that year.24 The measure increases as the di¤erence between the vote shares
22Besley et al (2010) examine data up until 2001.
23We are grateful to Jim Snyder for providing an updated dataset containing data through 2014.
24The length of the slates varies: in four of the states we analyze (Arkansas, Maine, New Hampshire and
New Jersey) it consists simply of the Governor, while at the other extreme Oklahoma adds the Lieutenant-
Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney-General and nine other o¢cials. Having more elections does not of
course give a State greater weight in our calculations: as said, the overall Democratic and Republican votes
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of the two main parties in state elections declines towards zero. Formally κst = − |dst − 0.5|
where dst is the average Democrat vote share in all state-wide races in state s at time t. Higher
κ thus means increased competition: in terms of the model in section 2, κ corresponds to
−
 ξβλ(1+ξm)φ
 in equation (15), which in the case of limits (ML = MR) simplies to −  ξβλφ
.
Figure 2 depicts year-averages across states of the political competition data over time.
As Besley et al (2010) discuss, the main story concerning political competition in the United
States in the second half of the twentieth century is its increase over time in the South-
ern states.25 Even though the poll taxes and literacy tests (and other barriers to voting)
were formally eliminated in 1965, political competition in many of these states remained
signicantly less than the national average for most of the 20th century.
Interestingly, more recently the data show a slight decline in average political competition
(on average in both the southern and non-southern states). Whilst still nowhere near as low
as that observed earlier in the southern states the decline is of some interest. Potentially this
reects growing polarization - perhaps into red and blue states in part via voter migration
(Tam Cho et al, 2013), but whatever its cause, the trend is of interest in its own right as
well as potentially having implications for legislation for political contributions.
Institutional data on political nance comes from Milyo et al (2011). To characterize
whether a regime has limits or operates under laissez faire we use an indicator variable
dened by the presence of limits on donations by private individuals to specic candidates. It
should be acknowledged that campaign nance regulations can take many di¤erent forms, for
example limits on expenditure as well as donation limits for organizations. By Federal statute
no state has implemented expenditure limits since 1974, so there is less usable variation in
this policy variable. We focus on limits on individual donors because donations from private
individuals represents the majority of total donations. For example Ansolabehere et al (2003)
report that $2.4bn out of the $3bn total donated in the 1999-2000 election cycle came from
individuals. There is also a reasonable correspondence between the individual donation limits
series and the existence of limits on organizations. (The correlation coe¢cient between the
on each occasion are averaged out before being entered as a single gure.
25The group of southern states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West
Virginia.
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two series is 0.51.)
A further challenge is that in practice limits (where they exist) vary in their stringency
from state to state, and also often vary depending on the electoral race (for example with
larger amounts often allowed in Gubernatorial races). A su¢ciently large (and non-binding)
limit would essentially amount to laissez-faire. Nonetheless, it is likely that limits are set to
bind in practice.26 Following the theory above we argue that the presence of limits would
represent the rst-order e¤ect. For example take the case of equal numbers of donors - as
long as the limits bind (regardless of their level), then limits will imply that ML = MR -
corresponding to the case of limits analyzed above. The level of the donation limit would
not matter, but its presence does.
There are other features of the political nance regime not encapsulated by the individual
donor limits indicator. After 2014 (i.e. beyond the last year of our sample) the cap on
aggregate donations (i.e. to all candidates) will be eliminated following McCutcheon v. the
FEC. This ruling represents a shift towards Laissez Faire, although has no implications for
limits on donations made to specic candidates.
We maintain that the individual donations indicator variable is an appropriate overall
measure of the extent to which campaign nance is regulated across states and through time.
Table 1 and Figure 2 describe these data, showing that there has been a trend towards man-
dating limits across the US. At the start of the sample only Maryland and New Hampshire
enforced limits, while by 2014 over 75% of states did. Arguably 2014 may denote a high
water-mark regarding limits on political nance. In particular if the McCutcheon ruling is
translated into state legislation, then at least donors will be free to support unlimited can-
didate numbers, even if the extent to which they can support individual candidates is still
limited. Also notable in the data is the clustering in regime-switching (from laissez-faire to
limits) that occurs in 1975. This event is discussed in more detail in subsection 3.4. Overall,
there is interesting and usable variation in the start-date in which states have applied limits
(if indeed they have at all).
26At the time of writing data from the National Conference of State Legislatures indicate limits generally
set between $1000-$5000 depending on the race as well as the state.
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3.2 Policy
Following Besley et al (2010) we analyze three policy variables - total state tax revenue as
a percentage of aggregate personal income, state infrastructure spending measured by the
percentage share of capital investment in government expenditure, and whether a state has a
right-to-work law. Undoubtedly these policy variables are imperfect proxies for rent-seeking
or the quality of government. The true extent of rent-seeking is intrinsically di¢cult to
measure, though like Besley et al (2010) (and many others) we argue that it is nonetheless
worthwhile examining whether observed policy (and growth in the next section) changes
with variables like political competition and particular institutions - and in the case of this
paper with the existence of limits on political donations.
Rent-seeking is dened, broadly, as pursuit by a government of objectives of its own 
however altruistic  that are opposed to those of the majority of the electorate. In the case
of high taxes, an extensive literature nds taxes to be potentially growth-compromising (e.g.
see Bergh and Henrekson 2011) and, at least in the context of the 50 American states, taxes
have also been found to negatively a¤ect the incumbent vote share (Besley and Case, 1995,
and Niemi et al, 1995). It therefore may be unlikely that state governments which raise taxes
are chasing votes, either directly or via improved growth performance. They might want to
spend the receipts on a particular section of the electorate. Or it could be that they want an
easy life and put low e¤ort into ensuring the tax receipts are spent e¢ciently, necessitating
higher taxes for any given results. In particular, if donors share in some of the governments
rents (as in the case of malign and weakly benign donors), then these rents would require
that taxes be higher for a given level of useful spending. Either way higher taxes can be seen
as a form of government rent to be traded o¤ against electoral success.
In contrast the second variable - public investment - is argued by Besley et al (2010) to
be positively related to government quality (hence negatively related to rent-seeking). High
infrastructure spending represents low rents so far as it promotes structural non-cyclical
growth, which gains votes (Maloney and Pickering, 2015) but may displace spending on
other projects which are dearer to the government or sectional interests that it wants to help
or please. A caveat here could be that infrastructure spending, for example the award of
construction contracts, is particularly susceptible to resource diversion.
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The third policy variable, right-to-work, protects workers who do not want to have to
join a union in order to get a job. Here the implications for growth are perhaps more
ambiguous  there is neither any convincing theory nor empirical evidence showing that in
general unionization is bad for growth. But in certain cases at least it will be  unions whose
pay demands push up or hold up the real exchange rate in an open economy may stie the
possibilities of export-led growth (Hein and Vogel, 2008). And in any case the issue here is
not primarily about growth and its electoral consequences, but rather about governments
passing laws to suit a minority  trades unionists who want everyone else to be one  against
the wishes of the median voter. Again this can be seen as a trade-o¤ between rent-seeking
and popularity.
For the sake of consistency with Besley et al (2010) our benchmark empirical specication
is:
τ st = ωs + υt + δ1κst + δ2Lst + δ3Lstκst + εst. (19)
The dependent variable captures the policy stance in state s at time t. ωs and υt are xed
state and year e¤ects. κst is the measure of political competition. Lst is an indicator variable
set equal to one if there are limits on donations that individuals can make to candidates in
state elections.27 ,28
Initially think of the dependent variable as rents. Then δ1 estimates the e¤ect of political
competition on the rents, and δ2 the e¤ect of limits on election spending at maximum political
competition. δ3 is the coe¢cient on the interactive term: if opposite in sign to δ1 it is saying
that spending limits reduce the e¤ects of political competition on rents.
Table 2 sets out our models prediction on the signs of δ1, δ2 and δ3 under di¤erent
regimes when rents are the dependent variable. δ1 is always negative (proposition 1: political
competition cuts rents). The sign of δ2 depends on whether donors are malign or benign
27Note that the existence of limits may itself a¤ect the degree of political competition, so far as they
dampen the advantages of the stronger party. (Though as noted in footnote 31 there is little correlation
between the two variables in the full dataset.) This provides an additional rationale for using an instrument
for political competition in the empirical analysis.
28Following Besley et al (2010) the regression model uses contemporaneous data. In principle one might
expect that policy might lag (or perhaps lead, if forward-looking) κst and Lst. The regression results reported
below are largely unchanged if we replace κst and Lst with their lags or leads. Both variables are slow-moving,
respectively with autocorrelation coe¢cients of 0.93 and 0.97.
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(propositions 3 and 4), while δ3 is positive as long as θ > 0 but can only be said to be
unambiguously negative at θs extreme value of -1 (propositions 5 and 6.)29
Table 3 contains estimates of (19) extending the results presented in table 2 of Besley
et al (2010) to include data for Lst and its interaction with political competition, κst over
the extended time horizon. There are three alternative specications for each dependent
variable. The rst (columns 1, 4 and 7) is a basic specication that includes xed e¤ects and
time e¤ects with robust standard errors clustered at the state level. The second (columns
2, 5 and 8) includes separate time dummies for the North and South given their separate
histories. The third (columns 3, 6 and 9) instruments political competition following Besley
et al (2010).30
Because (like Besley et al, 2010) we are taking taxes to be positively related to rents, the
predicted signs of δ1, δ2 and δ3 will be as in table 2 when taxes are the dependent variable. In
the case of infrastructure spending and right-to-work laws (assumed to be inverse to rents),
the predicted signs are reversed.
The rst general observation is that the unconditional impact of political competition
holds up in all cases. The second general observation is that the e¤ect of limits at the point
of maximum political competition (i.e. when κst = 0) in all 9 cases is suggestive of benign
donors. When political competition is maximized, then limits are associated with increased
taxes, reduced relative infrastructure spending (though here the estimates are insignicant),
and reduced right-to-work laws. These estimates suggest that laissez-faire is the desirable
policy if political competition is maximized.
However, when political competition deteriorates, the degree to which policy worsens is
estimated to be stronger under laissez-faire than under limits: in all 9 cases the coe¢cient
estimate for the interaction term (δ3) has the opposite sign to δ1 (which measures the un-
29The empirical analysis assumes that the benignity of donors (i.e. θ in the theoretical analysis) is xed
across states and across time. If in practice this varies, then the parameter estimates for δ2 and δ3 in
particular would become unstable.
30The instrumental variable used is derived from the exogenous (and as Besley et al (2010) note, surprising)
federal government intervention in southern states via the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA). For observations
prior to this date the instrument takes the value of the fraction of the population that was subject to either
literacy tests or poll taxes (or both) - a substantial fraction in many states, and thereafter taking the value
of zero. Clearly this event was pivotal, and also exogenous, in creating political competition in the south.
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conditional impact of political competition.) Again the estimated relationship is found to be
stronger for taxes and right-to-work laws. Taken together with the nding of a deleterious
impact of limits when political competition is maximized (δ2 negative for taxes and positive
for right-to-work), this is consistent with our notion of weakly benign donors.
In fact our quantitative estimates are consistent only with weakly benign donors. Fol-
lowing Besley et al (2010) if we take the example of κst = −0.3, compared with maximum
political competition (κst = 0) then using the estimates of column (1) taxes are 1.20%
higher (which is 0.83 standard deviations) under laissez-faire, but only 0.25% (0.17 stan-
dard deviations) higher under limits. When political competition is at its maximum, then
the results suggest that laissez-faire would be preferred, because of the positive estimate
for δ2. When κst = 0 taxes are estimated to be 0.298% higher under limits than under
laissez-faire. However at κst = −0.3 the greater increase in rent-seeking under laissez-faire
means that at this level of political competition limits would be preferred. Mathematically
1.20%− 0.25% > 0.298%.
So, as political competition declines, at what point do limits become the best option?
From equation (19), taxes with laissez-faire will exceed taxes with limits when δ2 + δ3κ < 0
i.e. when κ < − δ2
δ3
. So columns (1), (2) and (3) of table 3 predict, respectively, that limits
are better for a state when κ is less than -0.094, -0.107 and -0.084, i.e. when, in an average
election in that state, the leader has a majority exceeding 18.4%, 21.4% and 16.8%. (Less
weight should perhaps be given to the middle gure because not all the coe¢cients in column
2 were signicant.) When political competition is higher than these gures, then laissez faire
should be preferred.
Columns (3), (6) and (9) report results when political competition is instrumented using
the fraction of the population subject to literacy tests or poll taxes prior to the Voting Rights
Act. The rst-stage coe¢cient estimate for this variable is negative as expected and highly
statistically signicant, with large F-statistics. The (second-stage) results in these instances
are comparable to those found using OLS, which allays concerns that political competition
is endogenously related to limits (or their absence).31
31Moreover note that the correlation coe¢cient between political competition and the limits indicator is
low (at 0.093). If political competition is regressed against the limits indicator and year e¤ects, the coe¢cient
estimate is statistically insignicant (with a t-statistic equal to 0.14).
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One possible objection to these results is that the regressions exclude socioeconomic
control variables. Table 4 contains results where the regressions reported in table 3 are
augmented with state income per capita, the state population size, the percentage of the
population aged over 65, and the percentage of the population aged between 5 and 17. The
estimated signs and indeed the magnitude of the estimated coe¢cients change very little.
Overall, as with table 3 the results are generally consistent with the hypotheses constructed
under benign donors.
As a further robustness check, and following Besley et al, table 5 extends the analysis to
control for the governor a¢liation, and indicators for cases where both the lower and upper
state houses are controlled by one party.32 Columns (1), (3) and (5) contain results for the
three alternative dependent variables controlling for these additional variables. Columns (2),
(4) and (6) additionally control for the Democratic vote share (though as noted by Besley et
al (2010), it is unlikely to be an exogenous regressor). The econometric specication here in
all cases includes separate time dummies for the North and South. In all 6 regressions the
coe¢cient estimates are signed consistently with the case of benign donors. The parameter
estimates for Lst are positive in the case of taxes and negative for relative infrastructure
expenditure and right-to-work laws, whilst the interaction terms in all cases o¤set the esti-
mated unconditional e¤ect. Nonetheless, signicance levels tend to be lower in these more
demanding specications.
In a nal robustness check we examine whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of
alternative political institutions that might also impact rent seeking. Besley and Case (2003)
examine how state taxes are a¤ected by open/closed primaries (primarytype), the presence
and constraining e¤ect of tax/spending limitations (bind and nonbind), the existence of a
super-majority rules (supmaj ), governor line-item veto power (veto), divided government
(split), lame duck governors that cannot re-run for o¢ce (lameduck), and whether or not
the state allows voter initiatives (initiatives). Table 6 takes the benchmark specication
in column 1 of table 3 and includes these institutional variables one at a time.33 The
32Table 5 corresponds to table 3 in Besley et al (2010), but with additional terms for Lst and Lstκst.
Columns (1) and (2) correspond to their column (1) and (2). Columns (3) and (4) correspond to their (5)
and 6). Columns (5) and (6) correspond to their (9) and (10).
33Ideally, the institutional variables would all be included at once. Unfortunately, many of these variables
are correlated with each other. Besley and Case (2003) and Pickering and Rockey (2013) also take the
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unconditional e¤ect of limits (δ2) is estimated to positively impact taxes and is statistically
signicant at the 10% level at least in all eight cases. The parameter estimate for δ3 is in all
cases estimated to be positive, and is in most cases statistically signicant at the 10% level
of better.
There are important caveats to this analysis. As noted the policy variables are imperfect
measures of rent-seeking (though we are not the rst to use them in this context). Indeed
this mismeasurement may explain why statistical signicance drops in the more demand-
ing specications. Nonetheless the overall conclusion we draw is that limits on political
donations a¤ect economic policy, and do so in a way which depends on the degree of polit-
ical competition as proposed in the theory. The evidence is consistently suggestive of the
hypotheses constructed under weakly benign donors: limits are benecial at low levels of
political competition, but harmful at high levels.
3.3 Growth
Besley et al (2010) establish an empirical link between state level growth (gst), measured as
the annual growth rate of personal income in state s at time t and political competition.
The relationship is unambiguously positive - higher growth levels are positively associated
with greater political competition. In this subsection we investigate whether and how this
relationship is qualied depending on the political nance regime. The benchmark regression
specication in this instance is
gst = θs + υt + βyst−1 + δ1κst + δ2Lst + δ3Lstκst + εst, (20)
where yst−1 is lagged log income and other variables are dened elsewhere. It seems plausible
that rents taken by government, perhaps in the form of higher taxes, weak public investment,
corrupt labor laws, or indeed otherwise, would act to suppress economic growth. Therefore
the predicted signs of the coe¢cients are reversed as compared with table 2 and we now have
approach of examining particular institutions in isolation.
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Donor motives δ1 δ2 δ3
Malign (θ > 1) + + −
Weakly benign (0 < θ < 1) + − −
Strongly benign (−1 < θ < 0) + − −/+
Entirely benign (θ = −1) + − +
Table 7 contains estimation results. These results correspond to table 5 in Besley et al
(2010), though note that our sample commences later because the limits data begin in 1949,
and is extended through to 2014. The ndings are consistent with the picture of benign
donors that emerged from the analysis of policy and are surprisingly strong. Limits are
estimated to have a small, though statistically signicant, negative e¤ect on growth when
political competition is at its maximum (κst = 0). In all four specications estimated in table
7, laissez-faire in political nance is congruent with (very slightly) higher growth performance
under conditions of strong political competition. The interesting nding here, again which
holds in all specications, is that the positive impact of political competition is estimated to
only manifest itself under systems of laissez-faire. δ3 is consistently of greater magnitude than
δ1: the interaction e¤ect here is su¢ciently strong that under limits political competition if
anything has a negative impact on growth, although the combined e¤ect is never signicantly
di¤erent from zero. However, under laissez-faire, departures from maximum levels of political
competition are associated with a signicant lowering of economic growth.
In order to quantify these results consider a permanent deterioration in political compe-
tition from 0 to -0.1 (which is approximately one standard deviation over the entire period
1949-2014). When κst = 0 income per capita in the long run is estimated to be higher by
4.8% under laissez-faire than under limits (assuming of course that the regime change is
permanent).34 However at κst = −0.1 the greater sensitivity of growth (to political compe-
tition) under laissez-faire means that at this level of political competition limits would be
preferred. The growth di¤erential of 5.93% (the net growth improvement under limits in
response to the lower level of political competition) exceeds the direct loss of 4.8%. Thus
limits might be preferred as the policy when political competition is not at its maximum.
34Following Besley et al (2010) (their footnote 28), the long-run e¤ect of political competition on income
per capita is given by the estimates obtained from (20) for δ1/β.
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Table 8 contains estimation results, when socioeconomic control variables are included.
The inference is unaltered both in terms of magnitude of estimated relationships and statis-
tical signicance. The statistical relationship found between growth, political competition
and limits on political donations may still be due to unobserved di¤erences, but these are
not picked up in di¤erences in state demographic controls.
Table 9 mirrors table 6 in Besley et al (2010) extending the analysis of economic growth to
include political control variables. Consistent with the results from tables 7 and 8, the e¤ect
of political competition is estimated to be absent in regimes with limits on donations (Column
(1)). Column (2) additionally includes the Democratic vote share, and if anything the results
are strengthened. The e¤ect of limits at maximum political competition is estimated to be
negative and signicant at the 10% level. However because under laissez-faire growth is
estimated to deteriorate as political competition falls, then limits may still be the preferred
policy at lower levels of political competition.
The key criterion is again whether κ < − δ2
δ3
. If so, then limits on campaign spending
are better for growth then laissez-faire. Using the coe¢cient estimates from column 1 of
table 9 − δ2
δ3
approximately equals −0.095. This critical value is quantitatively very similar
to that found when examining the results examining the policy variables. When the average
percentage lead of the dominant party exceeds 19%, limits are preferable.
Column (3) of table 9 looks at 5 year averages of growth as the dependent variable.35 The
results again suggest that political competition is bad for growth when limits are applied,
and this time the results are statistically signicant. Under laissez-faire political competition
is positively associated with growth as found previously. As noted in the introduction it is
possible that political competition could under particular circumstances (that are not mod-
eled here) be detrimental to policy - perhaps raising politicians discount rates as proposed
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). This regression is an outlier compared with the other
results reported here, but certainly lays bare the conditionality of the political competition
result. Column (4) also uses 5 year averages of growth as the dependent variable, but this
35Columns (3) and (4) in table 9 respectively correspond to columns (7) and (8) in table 6 in Besley et
al (2010). As they note the advantage of using 5-year-averages are that it smooths out cyclical variations
and uctuations in both the dependent variable (income growth), and the explanatory variable (political
competition).
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time the estimation method is the Arellano and Bond GMM 1st di¤erence estimator. The
panel is a little shorter here than estimated previously, and so the Nickell (1981) bias may
be more of a problem and so these results might be considered preferable. The interaction
term again works strongly against the unconditional e¤ect (of political competition), though
quantitatively the results are similar to the previous ones.
Column (5) in table 9 replaces growth with a measure of structural change variable - the
share of non-farm income. The argument is that economic development may be proxied by
a move away from agriculture. Consistent with all of the other results here the interaction
term is estimated to work against the unconditional e¤ect, although here the signicance
is lower. It is possible that the later sample here is more of a problem in that a lot of the
structural change happened prior to 1960 (by which time the average non-farm-income share
was already 94%). The earlier sample analyzed by Besley et al (2010) is likely to be more
conducive to signicant results - though to repeat, the results found are supportive of the
general argument.
Table 10 takes the benchmark specication in column 1 of table 7 and addresses sensitivity
to political institutions. The results are essentially unchanged. In all cases the impact of
limits at maximum political competition is found to be negative, whilst the positive e¤ect of
political competition is again found to be substantially stronger under laissez-faire regimes.
Overall the growth regression results corroborate those found for policy. The ndings of a
stronger e¤ect of political competition under laissez-faire than under limits, and a deleterious
e¤ect of limits at maximum political competition again support the hypotheses constructed
above under weakly benign donors.
3.4 Exogenous Regime Change
The above empirical analysis follows previous literature in taking the political nance regime
to be exogenous. However, as noted in the introduction there remains the possibility that
state-level political nance regulation is determined jointly with state level policy. Finding a
satisfactory instrument that is both strong and which would satisfy the exclusion restriction
is di¢cult. For instance it seems plausible that various institutional characteristics might
explain the political nance regime. However as noted by Besley and Case (2003) institu-
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tional features play an important role in determining policy and therefore outcomes in the
US. Similarly it is widely recognized that the partisan composition of the state government
- another plausible candidate for explaining the existence or not of limits on donations -
is an important determinant of policy. Indeed variables for both institutions and partisan
composition are used as controls in the above analysis.
However it still remains that the nance regime is not a random treatment. As can
be seen in table 1 and gure 2, one aspect of this is that limits have increasingly been
applied over time. Undoubtedly a pivotal moment came in 1975, when 15 states switched,
permanently, from laissez-faire to a system of limits. The catalyst for this widespread shift
was theWatergate scandal, which eventually culminated in the resignation of president Nixon
in 1974. Following these events (which began in 1972) Congress established the Federal
Election Commission and substantially strengthened the Federal Election Campaign Act in
1974. At the time Fleishman (1975) wrote that "But for the embarrassing and widening wake
of Watergate... there would very likely have been no new campaign nance reforms in 1974."
Watergate thus determined Federal level policy. It is likely that state-level regime decisions
followed suit. If there is a perceived generic problem with political nance, then incumbent
politicians at the state level would amend the regime to reect the national zeitgeist.
Watergate by itself satises the conditions for a good instrument. It explains the wide-
spread regime shifts that occurred in one particular year. Moreover it was an event that
can be plausibly considered to be exogenous to state-level policy and growth. However, by
itself Watergate simply represents a pure time e¤ect, and these are already included in the
empirical analysis. In order to generate spatial variation we further posit that Watergate
had di¤erential salience across states depending on geographic distance from Washington
DC. Hence for Maryland and Virginia, Watergate has relatively strong resonance, whilst the
Watergate e¤ect was not so pronounced in Oregon and Washington State. We thus posit a
spatial discount rate, where the likelihood of imposing limits in the aftermath of Watergate
is modelled to fall, at least relatively, with distance from DC. For similar reasons we dis-
count the Watergate e¤ect temporally from 1975 at 5%. The salience of Watergate in 2005
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is certain to be much less than that in 1975. Our instrument is thus:
IVst = (0.95)
year−1975 ∗Watergatet ∗Distances
where Watergatet is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for 1975 and thereafter and 0 before
1975. Distancei is the distance in thousands of miles of the state capital from Washington
DC. Recall that all econometric specications used in this paper include time dummies. The
identication thus comes from the assumption that geographic distance fromWashington did
not matter before 1975, whilst it did after 1975, decaying thereafter. Even this argument
may be criticized: especially it is possible that economic performance since 1975 may have
depended for other reasons on proximity to the capital.
Table 11 contains estimation results where Limits are instrumented using IVst. All
specications include separate time dummies for the North and South. Column 1 contains
results for the rst-stage regression, where Limits are regressed against IVst and political
competition as well as the xed state and time e¤ects. This regression supports the above
reasoning. The coe¢cient estimate is negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level.
A one thousand mile increase in distance, in 1975, reduces the incidence of limits by 27%.
By 2005 however, the same distance is estimated to reduce the incidence of limits by only
6%.
Columns 2-4 contain estimation results for the policy variables, where Limits are instru-
mented as described. As with the OLS estimation, the results again support the benign
donors case, where limits are found to be detrimental for policy at high levels of political
competition, but benecial at low levels. The results are statistically signicant in the case
of taxes and the right-to-work laws. Nonetheless it should be acknowledged that the F-
statistic for the rst stage regression falls short of the conventional threshold of 10 for a
strong instrument.
However, when growth is used as the dependent variable in column 5 the results are all
insignicant. Indeed, taking these results at face value, then limits are positively (though
weakly) associated with growth at the highest level of political competition. This is in strong
contrast with the OLS results above. An explanation for this nding lies in the possibility
that economic performance since 1975 has depended for other reasons on distance fromWash-
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ington. In column 6 we maintain the IV approach, but also control for Watergatet∗Distances
- the undiscounted version of the instrument. In this regression it can be seen that growth
has been positively associated with proximity to the capital. The coe¢cient estimate for
Watergatet∗Distances is negative and signicantly di¤erent from 0. Moreover in this spec-
ication the coe¢cient estimates for the main variables of interest revert to their previous
status. Growth is negatively associated with limits at high levels of political competition, but
improved by limits at low levels of political competition. Nonetheless in this last regression
the power of the instrument inevitably drops given the additional related control.
As a further analysis of the consequences of the regime change that followed Watergate
we reduce the sample to the 15 states that changed their regime in this year, and did not
change at any other point (thus excluding Missouri, which reverted to laissez-faire for a
period). The drawback of this approach is that it substantially reduces the sample, but the
benet is that it isolates an exogenous regime change. Table 12 contains regression results
for the 15 Watergate states. Column 1 and 2 respectively contain the results for the tax
policy variable using data up until 1974 (i.e. under laissez-faire), and from 1975 onwards
(i.e. under limits). The regression specication corresponds to column 1 of table 3, and
includes state and year xed e¤ects. In column 1, under laissez-faire political competition
signicantly reduces taxes (the p-value here is 0.059), whilst in column 2 under the limits
regime the relationship is, whilst still negative as expected, quite a lot weaker and statisti-
cally insignicant. Column 3 and 4 repeat the analysis using infrastructure spending as the
dependent variable - corresponding to column 4 of table 3. In this instance statistical sig-
nicance is lower, though it can be observed that the magnitude of the estimated coe¢cient
falls below zero following the shift into the limits regime.36
Columns 5-6 repeat the analysis for growth in personal income - hence this time cor-
responding to column 1 of table 7. Once again there is a signicant change. In the early
sample (laissez-faire - column 5) the relationship between growth and political competition
is estimated to be positive and signicant (with a p-value of 0.018). After 1974 (limits -
column 6) the estimated relationship is statistically insignicant.
36It is not possible to produce corresponding results for right-to-work because there is no temporal
variation in this variable in the 15 Watergate states in the later sample.
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Whilst the sample here is by construction much smaller, the results are supportive of
the previous analysis using OLS and IV estimation. In the states that changed their regime
following the exogenous shock in 1975, the response of observable policy variables to political
competition changes, in the instance of taxes signicantly so. Similarly in the reduced form
growth regressions, there is a marked change in the political competition gradient.
3.5 Discussion
The analysis permits an evaluation of policy in practice across US states. Table 13 lists
actual current policy and the degree of political competition in the most recent observation
(in almost all cases corresponding to 2014). In subsection 3.3, the point estimate of the
threshold value of political competition as far as maximizing income per capita is κ = −0.095.
This was very similar to the median of the three estimates of this threshold when examining
policy. If we take this estimate at face value then states with political competition higher
than this threshold value should have laissez-faire, whilst states with low political competition
should have limits. By this criterion two thirds of states (32/48) have inappropriate policy.
The modal mistake, in 25 states, is to enforce limits when political competition is greater
than the threshold. There are 13 states which correctly impose limits given their lower
levels of political competition. Hence within the 38 states which impose limits, political
competition is in most cases high enough to warrant laissez faire. Intriguingly the opposite
holds in the 10 states with laissez faire, 7 of which have political competition levels below the
threshold. Hence only 3 of the states which actually deploy laissez faire observe su¢ciently
high political competition levels to merit this policy.
Interestingly when the same exercise is performed using older data (i.e. prior to Water-
gate), there are generally lower levels of political competition, yet a greater proclivity towards
laissez-faire. Arguably the tendency towards limits on donations would have been correct if
political competition were not simultaneously increasing. Given that political competition
has increased (notwithstanding more recent declines), the tendency towards application of
limits may well be mistaken.
On the other hand the recent McCutcheon ruling, which whilst not abolishing donations
limits represents a relaxation of the controls on political donations. In the case of Federal
32
elections, aggregate caps have been lifted and hence large donors may now contribute to
more candidates than before (with candidate-level limits still applying). Application of this
ruling to state-level politics will represent a loosening of restrictions, though not a compete
removal. At representative average levels of political competition the analysis of this paper
would support McCutcheon, and indeed further movement toward Laissez Faire. Nonetheless
the recent declines in state-level political competition (visible in Figure 2), with meaningful
numbers of states now identifying very clearly as either red or blue, is a cause for concern.
Should this continue, then there is a stronger case for maintaining and perhaps reinforcing
limits on political donations.
4 Conclusions
The paper sheds light on the debate on the desirability of limits on political nance. His-
torically this debate has been rather ideological - with proponents on the one side arguing
for the sanctity of free speech and on the other that donations and corruption must in all
instances be synonymous. Both the theory and the evidence presented here are more nu-
anced. Under weakly benign donors, when political competition is at its maximum, then
laissez-faire is preferred. Because rent-seeking also increases donations to the opposition,
when the two candidates donors are as numerous as each other, then free nance can act
as a deterrent to rent-seeking. Our interpretation is that the benets of free speech - and
advertising - are maximized when political competition is also at its maximum. However,
in states where incumbents have electoral advantage, then free-nance may act against the
public interest, because the deterrent to rent-seeking of increased donations to the opposi-
tion is weakened. Empirical evidence, in both OLS regressions and when the existence of
limits is instrumented using geographic and temporal distance from Watergate, supports the
argument that policies, and growth, improve with limits only when political competition is
low.
The analysis of the paper casts doubt on the trend towards enforcing limits given that
political competition is still, at least for the time being, reasonably strong. Similarly it casts
doubt on the practice in a small but signicant number of states where political competition
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is low of allowing laissez faire. At the time of writing, we conclude that most states are
getting their campaign nance laws wrong.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1:
Under limits (14) is minimized at p = 0.5. Thus the greater the political competition
(closer p is to 0.5), the lower R.
Under laissez-faire R = p
2
π1
+ (1−p)
2
π2
(18). Hereafter denoting (.)′ = d(.)
dλ
then R′ =
2pp′π1−p2π′1
π21
+
(2p−2)p′π2−(1−p)
2π′2
π22
. From (16) and (17), −π′1 = π
′
2, hence
R′ = π′2

p2
π21
−
p2
π22
+
(2p− 1)
π22

+ p′

2p
π1
+
(2p− 2)
π2

.
Assume without loss of generality that λ > 0. We have seen (in particular the discussion on
p. 12) that this means p > 0.5, whilst (15), (16) and (17) show that (given our assumption
that θ ≥ −1) p′ > 0, π2 > π1 and π
′
2 ≥ 0. In addition we assuming that π1, π2 > 0.
Therefore
p2
π21
−
p2
π22
+
(2p− 1)
π22
≥
(2p− 1)
π22
> 0
and
2p
π1
+
2p− 2
π2
≥
(4p− 2)
π2
> 0.
Therefore R′ > 0.
Proof of proposition 2:
We prove this in two parts: (i) With maximum political competition, the more malign the
donors, the higher the rents.
When λ = 0 (maximum political competition), p = 0.5 and hence (18), R = 1
4π1
+ 1
4π2
.
Also at λ = 0, from (16) and (17) π1 = π2, hence R =
1
2π1
. But dπ1
dθ
< 0 hence dR
dθ
> 0.
(ii) As political competition declines, the more malign the donors, the faster rents in-
crease.
When λ = 1 (minimum political competition), p = 1 and hence (18), R = 1
π1
. Therefore
 ≡ R (λ = 1)−R (λ = 0) =
1
2π1
+
1
4

1
π1
−
1
π2

.
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But from (16) and (17)
d 1
π1
dθ
>
d 1
π2
dθ
and
d 1
π1
dθ
> 0. Therefore d
dθ
> 0.
Proof of proposition 3:
We start with the case where λ = 0. R = 1
ξ
 
p2 + (1− p)2

(14). But if λ = 0, p = 0.5,
hence R = 1
2ξ
. Similarly R (λ = 0) = 1
4π1
+ 1
4π2
. But
1
4π1
+
1
4π2
=
φ
4

ξφ+ ξ2m
 
1−θ
2

(1− σ)−
 
1+θ
2
λ
 + φ
4

ξφ+ ξ2m
 
1−θ
2

(1− σ) +
 
1+θ
2
λ

=
φ
2

ξφ+ ξ2m
 
1−θ
2

(1− σ)

when λ = 0. Therefore θ < (>) 1 =⇒ 1
4π1
+ 1
4π2
> (<) 1
2ξ
. Therefore R > (<)R when
θ > (<) 1 (proposition 3(i)).
In the instance of λ > 0 note rst (from proposition 1) R
′
= p
′
ξ
(4p− 2) and R′ >
p′
h
2p
π1
+ (2p−2)
π2
i
. But λ > 0 =⇒ 1
π1
> 1
π2
∴
h
2p
π1
+ (2p−2)
π2
i
>
h
2p−1
π1
+ 2p−1
π2
i
= (4p− 2)
h
1
2π1
+ 1
2π2
i
>
(4p− 2) 1
ξ
(given θ > 1). Therefore R′ > R
′
(proposition 3(ii)). Combined with proposition
3(i) (that R > R when θ > 1 and λ = 0) this shows that rents are always higher under limits
when θ > 1.
Proof of Proposition 4:
When θ < 1 and λ = 0, R < R (proposition 3).
When λ = 1, p = 1, σ = 0 and hence (14), (18), and (16), R = 1
ξ
, R = 1
π1
and
π1 = ξ −
ξ2mθ
φ
.
Hence when λ = 1, R > R i¤ θ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5:
−1 ≤ θ < 0⇒ π1, π2 > ξ (using (16) and (17)).
∴ R−R =

1
π1
− 1
ξ

p2 +

1
π2
− 1
ξ

(1− p)2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
36
θ = −1 ⇒ π1 = π2 and π
′
1 = π
′
2 = 0 ((16) and (17)) Hence, since R =
1
ξ
 
p2 + (1− p)2

and R = p
2
π1
+ (1−p)
2
π2
it follows that R
′
= π1
ξ
R′. But at θ = −1, π1 > ξ. ∴ R
′
> R′.
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Figure 1: The e¤ect of political competition on rent-seeking in government.
Notes. R corresponds to the case of limits. RM , RWB, RSB, REB respectively denote
rent-seeking when donors are malign, weakly benign, strongly benign and entirely benign
(under laissez-faire conditions). Political competition is at its maximum when λ = 0, and at
its minimum when λ = 1.
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Figure 2: Political Competition and Laissez Faire in political contributions
Notes: compnorm_so and compnorm_no represent average political competition respec-
tively in the southern and non-southern US states - both measured on the left axis. The
critical degree of political competition of −0.095 is discussed in the text. laissez_faire is the
proportion of states with laissez-faire (i.e. not imposing limits on individual donations to
particular candidates) - measured on the right axis.
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State coverage State coverage State State
AL never IA never NE 1971-78 RI 1992-2014
AZ 1988-2014 KS 1975-2014 NV 1992-2014 SC 1992-2014
AR 1975-2014 KY 1975-2014 NH throughout SD 1975-2014
CA 1989-91; 2002-2014 LA 1989-2014 NJ 1975-2014 TN 1993-2014
CO 1998-2001; 2004-2014 ME 1975-2014 NM 2011-2014 TX never
CT 1975-2014 MD throughout NY 1975-2014 UT never
DE 1975-2014 MA 1971-2014 NC 1975-2014 VT 1975-2014
FL 1963-2014 MI 1975-2014 ND never VA never
GA 1992-2014 MN 1977-2014 OH 1998-2014 WA 1993-2014
ID 2000-2014 MS never OK 1971-2014 WV 1975-2014
IL 2011-2014 MO 1975-76; 79-80; 98-2006 OR never WI 1975-2014
IN never MT 1975-2014 PA never WY 1979-2014
Table 1. Limits on Donations
Notes: The data describes when and where legal limits have been applied on individual donations to candidates standing in
state elections, for the period 1949-2014. Thus limits were never applied in Alabama, and were applied between 1988 and 2014
in Arizona, and so on. Limits have been applied in Maryland and New Hampshire throughout.
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Donor motives δ1 δ2 δ3
Malign (θ > 1) − − +
Weakly benign (0 < θ < 1) − + +
Strongly benign (−1 < θ < 0) − + +/−
Entirely benign (θ = −1) − + −
Table 2. Theoretical Predictions
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Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Right-to-
work laws
Right-to-
work laws
Right-to-
work laws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
κst −4.012
(0.769)
∗∗∗ −3.091∗∗∗
(0.907)
−5.351
(1.334)
∗∗∗ 4.572
(1.865)
∗∗ 5.081
(3.157)
6.870∗
(3.483)
0.663
(0.333)
∗∗ 0.500
(0.335)
0.982
(0.437)
∗∗
Lst 0.298
(0.156)
∗ 0.246
(0.171)
0.378
(0.170)
∗∗ −0.840
(0.558)
−0.818
(0.588)
−0.977
(0.606)
−0.078
(0.036)
∗∗ −0.071
(0.039)
∗ −0.097
(0.044)
∗∗
κst ∗ Lst 3.177
(1.371)
∗∗ 2.303
(1.479)
4.520
(1.748)
∗∗ −0.303
(4.510)
−0.125
(5.204)
−2.608
(5.168)
−1.024
(0.368)
∗∗∗ −0.905
(0.415)
∗∗ −1.346
(0.463)
∗∗∗
South×year interactions No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Sample 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1949-2014 1949-2014 1949-2014
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.039∗∗ 0.227 0.025∗∗ 0.212 0.220 0.212 0.019∗∗ 0.076∗ 0.020∗∗
F-test (1st-stage) 42.36 42.36 45.05
β (1st-stage) −0.241
(0.037)
∗∗∗ −0.241
(0.037)
∗∗∗ −0.245
(0.036)
∗∗∗
Observations 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 3165 3165 3165
R-squared 0.787 0.799 0.850 0.857 0.867 0.870
Table 3. Policy: benchmark results.
Notes : All regressions include state and year xed e¤ects. Robustly estimated standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ respectively denote signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
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Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Right-to-
work laws
Right-to-
work laws
Right-to-
work laws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
κst −3.589∗∗∗
(0.899)
−2.990∗∗∗
(0.947)
−5.053∗∗∗
(1.679)
3.700
(2.116)
∗ 4.188
(3.087)
5.980
(4.292)
0.649∗
(0.333)
0.524∗
(0.316)
1.002∗
(0.522)
Lst 0.314∗∗
(0.149)
0.269
(0.164)
0.393∗∗
(0.167)
−0.783
(0.564)
−0.750
(0.583)
−0.893
(0.619)
−0.082
(0.031)
∗∗ −0.076
(0.035)
∗∗ −0.101∗∗
(0.038)
κst ∗ Lst 3.224
(1.365)
∗∗ 2.577
(1.431)
∗ 4.621
(1.928)
∗∗ 0.344
(4.758)
0.394
(5.142)
−1.663
(5.610)
−1.126∗∗∗
(0.398)
−1.015∗∗
(0.407)
−1.463∗∗∗
(0.528)
South×year interactions No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Sample 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.027∗∗ 0.142 0.031∗∗ 0.229 0.253 0.241 0.014∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.022∗
Observations 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117
R-squared 0.793 0.802 0.851 0.858 0.876 0.879
Table 4. Policy: robustness check - including socioeconomic controls.
Notes : As for table 3. Regressions include state income per capita, total population size, the percentage of the population aged over 65 and the
percentage of the population aged between 5 and 17 as additional control variables. Data availability slightly reduces the sample size in the instance
of the right-to-work laws.
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Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Right-to-
work laws
Right-to-
work laws
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
κst −3.048∗∗∗
(0.896)
−2.298∗∗
(0.859)
4.982
(3.153)
5.566
(3.022)
∗ 0.476
(0.340)
0.048
(0.306)
Lst 0.224
(0.170)
0.182
(0.167)
−0.802
(0.592)
−0.834
(0.572)
−0.064
(0.037)
∗ −0.040
(0.032)
κst ∗ Lst 2.305
(1.468)
1.772
(1.430)
−0.134
(5.227)
−0.549
(5.048)
−0.880∗∗
(0.410)
−0.576
(0.329)
∗
Democratic governor 0.015
(0.061)
−0.015
(0.065)
−0.107
(0.179)
−0.130
(0.194)
−0.009
(0.011)
0.008
(0.010)
Democratic control 0.214∗∗
(0.087)
0.202∗∗
(0.085)
−0.267
(0.246)
−0.276
(0.250)
−0.033
(0.020)
−0.026
(0.019)
Republican control −0.152
(0.068)
∗∗ −0.114
(0.068)
0.023
(0.388)
0.052
(0.377)
0.052∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.031
(0.016)
∗
Democratic vote share 1.067∗∗
(0.508)
0.831
(1.880)
−0.606∗∗∗
(0.158)
South×year interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.245 0.393 0.241 0.232 0.091∗ 0.200
Observations 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117 3117
R-squared 0.803 0.805 0.857 0.857 0.877 0.882
Table 5. Policy: robustness check - including political controls.
Notes : As for table 3. Democratic and Republican control implies simultaneous control of both house and senate.
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Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
κst −3.213∗∗∗
(0.621)
−3.367∗∗∗
(0.584)
−3.417∗∗∗
(0.701)
−3.175∗∗∗
(0.642)
−2.795∗∗∗
(0.597)
−3.341∗∗∗
(0.721)
−3.330∗∗∗
(0.682)
−2.660∗∗∗
(0.708)
Lst 0.346
(0.174)
∗ 0.275∗
(0.161)
0.316∗
(0.164)
0.411∗∗
(0.170)
0.416∗∗
(0.204)
0.337∗∗
(0.167)
0.354∗∗
(0.171)
0.288∗
(0.154)
κst ∗ Lst 2.263
(1.389)
2.617∗∗
(1.193)
2.423∗
(1.282)
2.589∗
(1.299)
1.048
(1.447)
2.729∗∗
(1.317)
2.630∗∗
(1.293)
1.889
(1.213)
primarytype 0.188
(0.124)
nonbind −0.502∗∗
(0.225)
bind 0.258
(0.179)
supmaj −0.644∗∗
(0.257)
veto −0.059
(0.279)
split −0.118∗∗
(0.059)
lameduck 0.085
(0.084)
initiatives 0.183
(0.365)
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.086∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.128 0.047∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.090∗
Observations 2250 2496 2496 2400 2016 2496 2448 1920
R-squared 0.832 0.836 0.833 0.839 0.839 0.833 0.832 0.814
Table 6. Policy: robustness check - including institutional controls.
Notes : As for table 3. primarytype is a dummy variable distinguishing open/closed primaries, nonbind takes a value of 1 if there are tax/spending
limitations but which do not bind, bind equals 1 if they do, supmaj is equal to 1 if a state requires a supermajority to enact increases in taxation,
veto equals 1 when a governor has a line-item budget veto, split equals 1 if the governors party is not that of the united majority party in the
legislature, lameduck equals 1 when the governor cannot re-run for o¢ce, and initiatives are equal to 1 when the state allows voter initiatives.
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Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
κst 0.062
∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.049∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.084∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.056∗
(0.033)
Lst −0.007
∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.007
(0.003)
∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.007
(0.003)
∗∗
κst ∗ Lst −0.086
∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.071∗∗∗
(0.022)
−0.110∗∗∗
(0.029)
−0.079∗∗
(0.038)
Lagged personal income −0.145∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.149∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.153∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.150∗∗∗
(0.020)
South×year interactions No Yes No Yes
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Sample 1949-2014 1949-2014 1949-2014 1949-2014
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.000
∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.098∗
Observations 3165 3165 3165 3165
R-squared 0.371 0.391
Table 7. Economic growth: benchmark results.
Notes: As for table 3.
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Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
κst 0.048
∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.035∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.075∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.046∗
(0.027)
Lst −0.007
∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.003)
∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.007
(0.003)
∗∗
κst ∗ Lst −0.075
∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.060∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.103∗∗∗
(0.026)
−0.071∗∗
(0.032)
Lagged personal income −0.158∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.164∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.166∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.140∗∗∗
(0.033)
South×year interactions No Yes No Yes
Method OLS OLS IV IV
Sample 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.031
∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.055∗
Observations 3117 3117 3117 3117
R-squared 0.378 0.399
Table 8. Economic growth: robustness check - including socioeconomic con-
trols.
Notes: As for table 4. Regressions here include total population size, the percentage of
the population aged over 65 and the percentage of the population aged between 5 and 17
as additional control variables. Data availability slightly reduces the sample size compared
with table 7.
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Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Share of non-
farm income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
κst 0.041∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.121∗∗∗
(0.030)
0.111∗∗∗
(0.042)
0.065∗∗
(0.026)
Lst −0.006
(0.002)
∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.029
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.023
(0.009)
∗∗ −0.004
(0.009)
κst ∗ Lst −0.063∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.065∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.318
(0.089)
∗∗∗ −0.213
(0.075)
∗∗∗ −0.046
(0.038)
Democratic governor 0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.007∗
(0.004)
0.008
(0.004)
∗∗ 0.000
(0.002)
Democratic control 0.000
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.002
(0.008)
0.004
(0.007)
−0.007∗
(0.003)
Republican control −0.002
(0.002)
−0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.007)
0.010
(0.007)
0.003
(0.004)
Democratic vote share 0.004
(0.011)
Lagged personal income −0.141∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.141∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.253∗∗∗
(0.039)
−1.010∗∗∗
(0.062)
Method OLS OLS 5-Year averages Arellano-Bond OLS
Sample 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.476
Observations 3117 3117 624 576 3117
R-squared 0.391 0.391 0.672 0.762
Table 9. Economic growth: robustness check - including political controls.
Notes: As for table 5. South × year interactions are included in all regressions.
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Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
κst 0.059∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.059∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.059∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.053∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.061∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.058∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.049∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.032∗∗
(0.013)
Lst −0.004
(0.003)
−0.005"
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.002)
−0.004∗
(0.002)
−0.005
(0.003)
−0.004∗
(0.002)
−0.004∗
(0.002)
−0.003
(0.002)
κst ∗ Lst −0.076
(0.030)
∗∗ −0.078
(0.027)
∗∗∗ −0.074
(0.027)
∗∗∗ −0.073
(0.024)
∗∗∗ −0.092
(0.029)
∗∗∗ −0.079
(0.028)
∗∗∗ −0.067
(0.024)
∗∗ −0.049
(0.021)
∗∗
Lagged personal income −0.134∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.129∗∗∗
(0.032)
−0.133∗∗∗
(0.033)
−0.117∗∗∗
(0.028)
−0.137∗∗∗
(0.032)
−0.130∗∗∗
(0.033)
−0.114∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.116∗∗∗
(0.032)
primarytype 0.002
(0.003)
nonbind −0.003
(0.003)
bind −0.006
(0.003)
∗
supmaj −0.001
(0.002)
veto −0.006∗
(0.003)
split 0.001
(0.001)
lameduck −0.001
(0.001)
initiatives 0.002
(0.002)
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample 1949-2001 1949-2001 1949-2001 1949-2001 1949-2001 1949-2001 1949-2001 1949-2001
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.052∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.078∗
Observations 2298 2544 2544 2400 2016 2544 2448 1920
R-squared 0.485 0.496 0.497 0.498 0.503 0.496 0.496 0.814
Table 10. Growth: robustness check - including institutional controls.
Notes : As for table 6.
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Lst Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Right-to-
work laws
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IVst −0.269
(0.100)
∗∗∗
Watergatet∗Distances −0.010
(0.004)
∗∗
κst −0.139
(0.289)
−5.090
(1.279)
∗∗∗ 8.777
(4.514)
∗ 0.827
(0.434)
∗ 0.014
(0.027)
0.108
(0.040)
∗∗∗
Lst 1.894
(0.842)
∗∗ −3.866
(2.709)
−0.348
(0.011)
∗ 0.020
(0.013)
−0.047
(0.028)
∗
κst ∗ Lst 11.28
(5.068)
∗∗ −16.72
(15.69)
−2.411
(1.260)
∗ 0.077
(0.081)
−0.290
(0.154)
∗
Lagged personal income −0.134∗∗∗
(0.024)
−0.134∗∗∗
(0.024)
Method OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Sample 1949-2014 1950-2014 1950-2014 1949-2014 1949-2014 1950-2014
Joint test of δ2 = δ3 = 0 0.078∗ 0.170 0.157 0.007∗∗∗ 0.089∗
F-test (1st-stage) 6.701 6.701 6.574 6.681 3.70
Observations 3165 3117 3117 3165 3165 3165
Table 11. Instrumental variables estimation. Notes: Column (1) reports results of the rst stage regression where Lst is regressed on
the IVst = (0.95)
year−1975 ∗Watergatet∗Distances as described in the text. Columns (2)-(5) contain estimation results where Lst is instrumented
by IVst. The F-test (1st-stage) reports the F-statistic for the rst stage regression. β (1st-stage) is the coe¢cient estimate for IVst in the rst stage
regression. South × year interactions are included in all regressions.
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Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Tax revenue
as a % of
state income
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Infrastructure
spending as
a % of state
government
expenditure
Growth of
personal
income
Growth of
personal
income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
κst −1.700∗
(0.807)
−0.284
(1.284)
10.26
(10.23)
−1.255
(3.525)
0.139∗∗
(0.052)
0.003
(0.021)
South×year interactions No No No No No No
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample 1950-1974 1975-2014 1950-1974 1975-2014 1949-1974 1975-2014
Watergate Watergate Watergate Watergate Watergate Watergate
Observations 375 597 375 597 390 597
R-squared 0.892 0.763 0.602 0.769 0.517 0.430
Table 12. Exogenous regime change results
Notes : Reported results correspond to the 15 (Watergate) states that changed regimes in 1975 (see table 1). Other notes as for table 3.
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State PC Regime State PC Regime State PC Regime State PC Regime
AL −0.129 LF IA −0.039 LF NE −0.147 LF RI −0.106 Limits
AZ −0.038 Limits KS −0.114 Limits NV −0.091 Limits SC −0.097 Limits
AR −0.080 Limits KY −0.043 Limits NH −0.021 Limits SD −0.177 Limits
CA −0.069 Limits LA −0.004 Limits NJ −0.069 Limits TN −0.207 Limits
CO −0.016 Limits ME −0.106 Limits NM −0.005 Limits TX −0.115 LF
CT −0.016 Limits MD −0.062 Limits NY −0.106 Limits UT −0.206 LF
DE −0.052 Limits MA −0.105 Limits NC −0.008 Limits VT −0.098 Limits
FL −0.062 Limits MI −0.012 Limits ND −0.136 LF VA −0.022 LF
GA −0.064 Limits MN −0.045 Limits OH −0.113 Limits WA −0.046 Limits
ID −0.107 Limits MS −0.110 LF OK −0.142 Limits WV −0.028 Limits
IL −0.051 Limits MO −0.025 Limits OR −0.066 Limits WI −0.018 Limits
IN −0.109 LF MT −0.001 Limits PA −0.049 LF WY −0.214 Limits
Table 13. Policy in Practice
Notes: PC denotes measures of political competition (κ) for 2014. Regime denotes whether Limits or
Laissez-Faire (LF) applies. Bold and italicized lettering denotes that the regime-type is suboptimal given
the estimate of the critical degree of political competition of κ = −0.095.
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